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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic put a large burden on many 
healthcare systems, causing fears about resource scarcity 
and triage. Several COVID-19 guidelines included age 
as an explicit factor and practices of both triage and 
’anticipatory triage’ likely limited access to hospital 
care for elderly patients, especially those in care homes. 
To ensure the legitimacy of triage guidelines, which 
affect the public, it is important to engage the public’s 
moral intuitions. Our study aimed to explore general 
public views in the UK on the role of age, and related 
factors like frailty and quality of life, in triage during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. We held online deliberative 
workshops with members of the general public (n=22). 
Participants were guided through a deliberative 
process to maximise eliciting informed and considered 
preferences. Participants generally accepted the need 
for triage but strongly rejected ’fair innings’ and ’life 
projects’ principles as justifications for age- based 
allocation. They were also wary of the ’maximise life- 
years’ principle, preferring to maximise the number of 
lives rather than life years saved. Although they did not 
arrive at a unified recommendation of one principle, a 
concern for three core principles and values eventually 
emerged: equality, efficiency and vulnerability. While 
these remain difficult to fully respect at once, they 
captured a considered, multifaceted consensus: utilitarian 
considerations of efficiency should be tempered with 
a concern for equality and vulnerability. This ’triad’ of 
ethical principles may be a useful structure to guide 
ethical deliberation as societies negotiate the conflicting 
ethical demands of triage.
INTRODUCTION
The first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic put a 
large burden on many healthcare systems. Fears arose 
that demand for resources would exceed supply, 
necessitating triage in critical care, for example, 
when allocating intensive care unit (ICU) beds. The 
role of age in resource allocation was an especially 
salient issue given the proclivity of SARS- CoV-2 
to cause excess mortality in older groups. Several 
COVID-19 triage guidelines included age as an 
explicit factor,1–4 and practices of both triage and 
‘anticipatory triage’ likely limited access to hospital 
care for elderly patients, especially those in care 
homes.5–8 This raised ethical and societal questions 
about the role of age in triage decision making.9–11
In medical ethics literature, different principles 
for resource allocation exist. Following a scoping 
review, we identified four that have explicit impli-
cations for the use of age as a deciding factor in 
triage:(1) the ‘fair innings’ principle, (2) the ‘life 
projects’ principle, (3) the ‘egalitarian principle’ 
and (4) the ‘maximise life years’ principle. (1) 
The ‘fair innings’ principle prioritises younger 
over older people so that younger people also get 
the chance to reach later life stages.12 (2) The ‘life 
projects’ principle prioritises young to middle- aged 
people so that everyone gets the chance to complete 
their life projects (eg, raising children and making 
a career).13 (3) The egalitarian principle calls for 
equal treatment of all and does not permit discrim-
ination on the basis of age, meaning we must take 
a ‘lottery’ or ‘first come, first served’ approach.14 15 
(4) Finally, the ‘maximise life years’ principle, a 
utilitarian approach, permits indirect discrimina-
tion on the basis of age insofar as this maximises the 
amount of life years saved.16
These principles have conflicting implications. 
Our study aimed to explore general public views 
on the role of age in triage decision making during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, we wanted 
to understand attitudes to the aforementioned four 
allocation principles, as well as on related factors 
such as quality of life and frailty. We also sought 
to understand, and elicit, participants’ considered 
recommendations on triage, with a view to devel-
oping ethical guidelines that are sensitive to public 
thinking.
METHODS
We held deliberative workshops with members of 
the general public following the general method 
of deliberative democracy,17–19 in collaboration 
with UK market research company Ipsos MORI, 
which has expertise in deliberative workshops. 
We requested them to recruit 25 participants from 
South East London, so as to inform clinical ethics 
forums in hospitals associated with King’s College 
London. Participants were guided through a delib-
erative process so they could arrive at an informed 
and considered opinion on topics that may have 
been new or unfamiliar to them. Four workshops, 
each lasting 2 hours, took place during 3 weeks 
across August and September 2020, in a particular 
social window between the first and second wave 
of COVID-19. This was an opportunity for partic-
ipants to discuss the complex ethical questions on 
triage in a context in which its importance was 
pertinent. Three participants dropped out before 
the first session for personal reasons. Nineteen 
participants took part in all four sessions; the three 
remaining participants each took part in three out 
of four sessions.
Deliberative democracy offers medical ethics a 
promising way to consult public preferences while 
ensuring these are adequately informed and consid-
ered. The sessions met the three standards for delib-
eration set out by Blacksher et al.20 First, sessions 
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included informative presentations to provide ‘balanced, factual 
information that improves participant’s knowledge of the issue’. 
Second, we ensured ‘the inclusion of diverse perspectives’ 
through strategic sampling: participants reflected the demo-
graphics of the demographically diverse boroughs of Lambeth 
and Southwark (see table 1 for sample characteristics). We made 
particular effort to include participants over 60 years. Third, 
participants were given ‘the opportunity to reflect on and discuss 
freely a wide spectrum of viewpoints and to challenge and test 
competing moral claims’: the sessions included plenary discus-
sions and discussions in smaller breakout groups, which were 
facilitated by experienced qualitative research staff from Ipsos 
MORI. Facilitation was non- directive and neutral with respect 
to content but active in promotion of an engaged, inclusive 
process among participants.
The research team (GO, MNIK, ARK) observed sessions and 
held discussion with the facilitators between workshops. The 
sessions were transcribed by professional note takers, and tran-
scriptions were thematically analysed in two stages. First, general 
themes were identified in the raw data by Ipsos MORI and the 
research team and summarised in the report. In a second step, 
the research team analysed the raw data again with particular 
focus on the ethical reasoning underlying discussions.
Ahead of the study, we worked with Ipsos MORI to develop 
a detailed but accessible discussion guide for the workshops 
and survey questions to be answered by participants after each 
session. We also developed information materials to present 
to participants: a presentation on how resource allocation 
and treatment escalation works in England’s National Health 
Service, an overview of relevant data on how COVID-19 affects 
the elderly, video presentations spelling out the four alloca-
tion principles, materials explaining the concepts of frailty and 
quality of life and case vignettes showing how triage dilemmas 
may arise. These materials and further details of the methods are 
reported elsewhere.21
During session 1, the information materials were presented 
to participants, and initial reactions to the four principles were 
briefly explored in breakout groups. During session 2, case study 
examples were discussed in breakout groups to examine the 
practical implications of the respective principles. During session 
3, participants were introduced to the notions of frailty and 
quality of life and explored these in breakout groups through 
one further hypothetical triage dilemma. Participants also delib-
erated further on the four principles and were asked to spell 
out their concerns about them. During session 4, participants 
were asked to formulate final recommendations and caveats in 
breakout groups. They also discussed how recommendations 
should be implemented and communicated to the public.
Given pandemic safety measures, the workshops were 
conducted online on Zoom. This was a relatively novel approach 
to deliberative democracy. Benefits of this approach were that 
participants felt more comfortable expressing opinions about 
sensitive subjects, carers or family members could more easily 
support older or vulnerable participants to contribute to the 
deliberations, and there was more time between sessions for 
reflection than with face- to- face sessions, which usually take 
place within 1 day. Downsides were that some participants expe-
rienced minor technical difficulties.
All participants gave informed consent before taking part.
FINDINGS
‘Fair innings’ and ‘life projects’ principles
The ‘fair innings’ and ‘life projects’ principle were strongly 
rejected from the outset and throughout the deliberative process. 
Participants found the ‘fair innings’ principle arbitrary and unnu-
anced, as well as unfair. They felt that age alone does not provide 
sufficient information about someone’s medical condition and 
that the lives of older people are important too: ‘We should 
get all equal treatment, young or old, we’re all the same’. Some 
participants also mentioned the contributions of the elderly to 
society, stating that ‘older people have just as much to give to 
society as younger people do’. The ‘life projects’ principle was 
equally firmly rejected, on the basis that it was normalising, 
favouring existing societal norms that not everyone meets: ‘It’s 
very discriminatory and not right. There are late developers. 
There are people who bloom later or earlier in life’. It was also 
emphasised that retirement was a time in which, after a life of 
work, people are finally free to start and pursue their life proj-
ects: ‘When you get older, that’s when you want to start proj-
ects. […] There are a lot of people almost having second lives 
doing all the things they couldn’t do previously’. Dismissing this 
period, therefore, seemed counterintuitive.
Egalitarian principle
The egalitarian principle was accepted, though a number of 
concerns about it were raised throughout the study. Initially, 













Socioeconomic grade (based 
on chief occupation of head of 
household)
B (higher and intermediate managerial, 
administrative, professional occupations)
4
C1 (supervisory, clerical and junior 
managerial, administrative, professional 
occupations)
9
C2 (skilled manual occupations) 6
D (semiskilled and unskilled manual 
occupations)
2
E (unemployed and lowest grade 
occupations)
4
Working status In full- time employment 8
In part- time employment 6
Currently not in paid employment 4
Retired 7
Highest level of education No qualifications 3
GCSE Level or equivalent (usually age 16 
years)
4
A- Level or equivalent/vocational 
qualifications (usually age 18 years)
5
College/university degree level or 
equivalent
12
Postgraduate degree level 1
GCSE, General Certificates of Secondary Education.
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this principle was received as the most straightforward and 
fairest principle, but as discussion progressed, worries emerged 
about its practical application. First of all, participants rejected 
a randomised ‘lottery’ approach, preferring a ‘first come, first 
served’ version of this principle: ‘lottery doesn’t feel like a 
good system when it’s people lives. It’s inappropriate’. But even 
the latter approach raised concerns. Participants were mostly 
worried about hidden inequalities, stating this approach would 
not redress, and even risk reinforcing, existing inequalities (eg, 
people with better access to the hospital may get there sooner). 
One participant said that ‘first come, first served isn’t egalitarian 
and you have the socio- economic challenges because, if you are 
in a particular class, you’re in a better position to be able to 
take care of yourself and get to the doctors first’. There were 
further concerns that a ‘first come, first served’ approach would 
waste valuable resources, when patients with a worse prognosis 
happen to arrive earlier. Finally, some participants felt uneasy 
that, on this approach, resources would not necessarily go to 
those who need them most: ‘On the face of it, it looks good, but 
I think means that those that come in later who are in greater 
need haven’t got access’. A few participants remained in favour 
of an egalitarian approach, though all accepted that, if a patient’s 
prognosis is extremely poor, they should not be escalated for 
treatment: ‘if you were following the egalitarian principle but 
you have someone in front of you who the evidence would 
suggest is highly unlikely to survive treatment and you’ve got 
someone who is highly likely to survive, as unfair as it may seem, 
it feels like it would be an important consideration […] I’m only 
thinking about extreme cases where you’ve got someone who 
is extremely frail and therefore extremely unlikely to survive’.
‘Maximise life years’ principle
When the ‘maximise life years’ principle was introduced, imme-
diate concerns were raised about the accuracy of medical judg-
ments about life expectancy: ‘Nobody knows how long anybody 
is going to live for. There are some assumptions, even if you’ve 
got two people in front of you, one who is 40 and one who is 
60’. Furthermore, in discussing this principle, participants spon-
taneously distinguished survival chance from life expectancy 
in the deliberations and strongly favoured the former. They 
supported maximising the number of lives saved, rather than the 
amount of life years saved: ‘There’s a logic in maximum number 
of lives you save irrespective of the number of life years they 
have’. The underlying reasoning seemed to be that every life is of 
equal value: a majority of participants agreed that ‘a life is a life’.
It was thus widely felt that a patient’s immediate medical 
condition was a very important factor in triage, insofar as this 
informed their chances of survival. In this context, participants 
recognised frailty as a key factor: though it was not initially 
understood as a medical term, it was eventually accepted as a 
relevant prognostic variable for predicting survival chances.
Some participants questioned the survival chance- based 
approach, though. For example, a small number of participants 
expressed concern about the disproportionate effects it could 
have on groups that may be more vulnerable to COVID-19: ‘By 
virtue of prioritising survival of the fittest, it will discriminate 
and people are uncomfortable with this because it means older 
people will be less likely to be escalated, people in wheelchairs, 
people in BAME communities’. Another more widespread worry 
was that this approach failed to allocate resources in accordance 
with need. These concerns led some participants to formulate a 
new, vulnerability- based allocation principle, which is discussed 
further below.
Quality of life
The notion of quality of life was initially treated with suspicion, 
seen as inviting unconscious bias and too subjective: ‘I don’t 
know if professionals can really confirm how somebody’s well- 
being is’. Throughout the study, it was increasingly accepted, 
though mostly as a secondary factor when patients’ medical 
conditions are highly similar, in which case those with a higher 
quality of life would be prioritised. Caveats were that it should 
only be applied in extreme cases and that quality of life assess-
ments should, where possible, involve ‘input of the person, their 
family, carers and that kind of stuff ’ to avoid biased assessments.
However, one participant said those with a lower quality of 
life should be prioritised, so that their quality of life may be 
improved. Some also noted that quality of life may be strongly 
influenced by socioeconomic factors, indicating a danger of 
exacerbating existing inequalities: ‘I do worry with quality of 
life, the more money you have, the better quality of life you tend 
to have […] your health is defined by your class and how much 
money you have’.
Vulnerability
Throughout the study, concerns were expressed about vulnera-
bility, especially in reaction to the utilitarian approach. In these 
discussions, participants struggled to formulate an additional 
allocation principle. This had two aspects, though these were not 
always clearly differentiated. One aspect concerned vulnerable 
groups (eg, age, disability or ethnic groups) who may be dispro-
portionately affected by the virus itself or the social response 
to it (eg, unconscious bias). One participant said: ‘we know it 
affects the elderly at higher rates than the youth. […] It makes 
the most sense to prioritise the elderly over the young, just on 
the basis of the percentages of old people vs young people dying. 
Young people are more likely to survive’. There was, however, 
some disagreement over whether positive action for these groups 
should indeed be taken to mitigate the vulnerability or whether 
this was itself a form of discrimination.
The other aspect concerned individuals in need (eg, those 
presenting to hospital as sicker) and whether a humane principle 
was to prioritise those in greatest medical need: ‘The more help 
somebody needs, the more they should get’. Some suggested to 
prioritise those least likely to survive: ‘I think the most vulner-
able should be prioritised. […] If you think you can save them, 
then prioritise them’. Reasons given for such an approach were 
that ‘the true measure of any society is how it treats its most 
vulnerable members’. But, again, it was accepted that if treat-
ment was unlikely to succeed, patients should not be escalated: 
‘you give the resources to the people that most need it, in my 
opinion, up until the point where the giving of resources is next 
to useless, where it’s ascertained that they will die anyway’.
Other participants rejected this need- based approach alto-
gether, out of a concern for efficiency: ‘Does that mean, if those 
people are most likely to die, you’re directing your resources at 
people who are weaker? So resources could be going to a group 
who stand the least chance of surviving? That doesn’t feel like a 
great use of resources’.
Implementation
During the final workshop, participants were asked how their 
recommendations should be implemented. We found strong 
support for discretion (applying recommendations as guidance 
rather than a mandatory policy), and participants felt groups 
of doctors, not individuals, should make decisions as this could 
reduce burden and bias. Thus, guidelines should not be binding 
but instead guide expert deliberation, and this deliberation 
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is ideally executed by teams rather than individuals, so that 
different perspectives can be considered.
DISCUSSION
In summary, we observed a strong rejection of the two explicitly 
age- based principles; a tolerance for an egalitarian ‘first come, 
first served’ principle, though with doubts about sufficiency; 
wide support for a newly formulated approach based on survival 
chances, with some consideration of frailty and quality of life; 
concerns about group vulnerability and individual need; and 
a preference for discretion and deliberation in triage decision 
making.
These findings raise important questions regarding existing 
guidelines and expert recommendations, when and where they 
do not align with them. Fallucchi et al22 have observed similar 
public intuitions, which digress from US triage guidelines, but 
conclude that the public requires more education. We found, 
however, that these public moral intuitions persist even after 
a robust process of reflection and deliberation. We think this 
warrants serious consideration of public preferences.
A first preference deserving serious consideration is the stark 
rejection of direct discrimination on the basis of age, as well as 
the use of randomised ‘lottery’ approaches, both of which have 
been observed in similar studies.22 23
A second focal point is the preference for survival chance over 
life expectancy, which also has been observed elsewhere.19 22 
Savulescu et al24 have criticised the UK’s NICE guidelines on 
resource allocation during COVID-1925 for including consid-
erations of survival chance but not life expectancy. The NICE 
guidelines reject the latter as it results in indirect discrimination 
on the basis of age. According to Savulescu et al, however, the 
guidelines already tolerate indirect discrimination since basing 
triage on survival chance will also disproportionally affect the 
elderly. The authors thus assume both factors operate on the 
same logic. However, we suspect our participants may have 
highlighted an ethically relevant distinction between survival 
chance and life expectancy. In fact, there are at least two ways 
in which these factors may be different. First, considering life 
expectancy in triage seems closer to direct age- based discrimina-
tion. While survival chance is closely linked to age specifically in 
the context of COVID-19, life expectancy has a closer (indeed 
almost conceptual) link to age: to be older simply is to be closer 
to death. A similar distinction between survival chance and life 
expectancy has been made by Mello et al,26 who argue that only 
the latter results in disability- based discrimination. Second, a live 
saved and a life year saved seem to produce a different kind 
of value: a life saved is a categorical outcome, whereas a life 
year saved is a scalar outcome. This conceptual difference seems 
ethically relevant because most participants considered any life 
saved of inherent value, regardless of its predicted length: it is 
‘about saving as many people as possible, even if they have a 
shorter life’. On this logic, saving more of a life does not produce 
additional value.
A third finding deserving of consideration is the concern 
about vulnerability. The core values of equality and efficiency, 
and the question of how to balance both, are central to discus-
sions about resource allocation. During our study, however, a 
third relevant principle spontaneously emerged from the discus-
sions: vulnerability. Though this notion was not unpacked in 
much detail during the deliberations, it alludes to values of anti-
discrimination and protection, in line with emerging debates in 
the literature.27 28
How can these public intuitions be incorporated into triage 
decisions? Participants generally accepted the need for triage 
but did not arrive at a unified recommendation of one prin-
ciple; indeed, in the final survey, recommendations included a 
mixture of principles and factors. However, a concern for three 
core principles and values emerged. As mentioned, deliberation 
resulted in the formulation of three broad, but distinguishable, 
allocation principles: an egalitarian ‘first come, first served’ prin-
ciple, a utilitarian principle (but based mainly on survival chance 
and frailty) and a ‘vulnerability’ principle. The underlying core 
values of each of these principles could be described as equality, 
efficiency and vulnerability, respectively. In other words, a ‘triad’ 
of ethical values emerged. While these remain very hard to 
fully respect at once, they captured a considered, multifaceted 
consensus. All three principles were embedded in caveats and 
raised their own set of concerns. Notably, for each principle, 
these caveats and concerns can be linked back to the two other 
values of the triad:
 ► The egalitarian ‘equality’ principle raised concerns about 
efficiency and vulnerability: if treatment was likely futile, it 
was agreed that patients should forgo it (efficiency concern); 
participants worried strongly about hidden inequalities 
(vulnerability concern).
 ► The ‘efficiency’ principle raised concerns about equality 
and vulnerability: most agreed that if there was a ‘close call’ 
between patients, an egalitarian approach should be adopted 
instead (equality concern); some worried about groups more 
vulnerable to COVID-19 and about individuals with greater 
clinical need (vulnerability concerns).
 ► The ‘vulnerability’ principle raised concerns about equality 
and efficiency: many participants resisted the notion of posi-
tive discrimination for vulnerable groups (equality concern); 
many also worried that scarce resources would be ‘wasted’ 
on vulnerable individuals as they may not survive or take up 
more time in ICU (efficiency concerns).
We are hopeful, therefore, that this ‘triad’ of ethical principles 
may be a useful structure to guide ethical deliberation as societies 
negotiate the conflicting ethical demands of triage.
This links to our finding that participants favoured discre-
tion and group deliberation in triage decisions. In light of this, 
the triad may offer a useful framework, as it does not prescribe 
one single principle but rather a balancing exercise among three 
core values, ideally performed by a team of deliberators. In sum, 
rather than inviting moral paralysis, we hope this triad could 
guide fruitful case discussion for doctors, reduce moral distress 
and give them more confidence that the triage decisions they 
arrive at have public acceptability.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
Strengths
We achieved a purposeful sample, there was a high level of 
participant engagement, participants showed they could think 
through complex ethical topics, a triad consensus emerged from 
a very diverse South- East London group, indicating a degree of 
robustness and there was the ecological validity of doing this 
study in the social window in between two COVID-19 waves.
Limitations
The South- East London sample may not generalise to other 
areas, findings may not generalise to other triage contexts (eg, 
pandemics effecting children) and some elements, for example, 
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CONCLUSION
To ensure the legitimacy of triage guidelines, which affect the 
public, it is important to engage the public’s moral intuitions, as 
they do not always align with expert recommendations. Guiding 
the public through a process of deliberation ensures that public 
intuitions do not stem from ignorance or misunderstanding but 
rather express genuine and considered preferences. We found 
that (widespread) utilitarian considerations of efficiency should 
be tempered with a concern for equality and vulnerability.
Twitter Scott Y Kim @scottbioethics
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